Is a live dog better than a dead lion? Seeking alternative growth engines in the Visegrad

countries by Sass, Magdolna
47Condemned to be left behind?
Chapter 2 
Is a live dog better than a dead lion? 
Seeking alternative growth engines in the Visegrad 
countries
Magdolna Sass
1. Introduction1
After the crisis years, there was an overall disenchantment with the foreign direct 
investment (FDI)-based growth models in the Central European post-socialist countries. 
FDI resulted in lower than expected convergence and in over-high exposure to foreign 
economic and political forces, inducing Visegrad governments (and governing parties) 
to seek new economic policies, either to catch up or at least to achieve stable political 
success despite relatively low post-crisis economic growth. Obviously, the previous 
growth engines – foreign multinational companies and their local subsidiaries – are 
still expected to play albeit a smaller role in these new policies, and some of them 
are now discriminated. Alternative or supplementary ‘growth-driving’ (or ‘growth-
illusion-driving’) companies are being sought by the governments, possibly groups 
of domestically-owned or -controlled enterprises. Their main role will be to stimulate 
growth or at least provide the illusion of catching up economically (or in welfare terms) 
with the core European Union countries.
In this chapter, I will concentrate on four Visegrad countries (Czechia, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia), the economies which opened up earliest and to the greatest extent to FDI 
in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region. However, because the changes in the 
economic role foreign-owned subsidiaries are ‘allowed’ to play are the most pronounced 
in Hungary, the qualitative analysis will focus on this country. 
I start by briefly presenting the FDI-based models of the Visegrad countries, moving 
on to look at how the emphasis on the role of the local subsidiaries of multinational 
companies has changed recently in the Visegrad countries. I then go through the 
possible other groups of economic players who could replace them in an attempt to 
stimulate these economies: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), regional multinationals, 
and large domestic companies and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The 
last section draws conclusions.
1. Research on regional multinationals was supported by the Hungarian Research Fund OTKA (109294).
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2. FDI-based growth models in the Visegrad economies
The problem of convergence and catching up with more developed countries has always 
been a key topic in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and among them in 
the four Visegrad countries. Throughout their history, their distance to the dynamic and 
wealthy European regions has constantly fluctuated. 
After the post-1989 transition process, all countries opened up their economies to FDI, 
albeit at different times. FDI inflows accelerated shortly before they joined the European 
Union. Governments (and experts) expected that, besides providing capital and creating 
numerous jobs, FDI would contribute significantly to economic restructuring, boosting 
growth and helping the CEE countries catch up with their Western counterparts. This 
would be achieved directly through backward and forward linkages impacting domestic 
companies as well as indirectly through intensifying competition and thus raising 
company competitiveness and productivity. Early experiences in two countries, Estonia 
and Hungary, and later in other CEE economies, seemed to support that expectation 
(Neuhaus 2006; Kornecki and Raghavan 2011), although even then certain analyses 
questioned the size and thus the significance of the impact (see e.g. Mencinger 2003).
However, looked at from a longer-term perspective, while the inflow of FDI contributed 
considerably to the restructuring of the economies in question, most of the expectations 
concerning their beneficial impact on domestic companies and thus enhanced 
competitiveness, growth and convergence with the more developed member countries 
of the European Union were only partially fulfilled. This was due to a number of 
factors: over-high expectations, economic policy mistakes, the inability of domestic 
firms to become partners of local MNC subsidiaries, and last but not least the generally 
low inclination of MNCs to rely on local firms. Furthermore, other global economic 
developments connected to the appearance of mainly Asian competitor countries 
with substantially lower wages and the shrinking of distance due to technological 
developments further complicated their situation (more details in e.g. Bohle and 
Greskovits 2007; Galgóczi 2009; Narula and Bellak 2009; Farkas 2013 or Szanyi 2016). 
Furthermore, this FDI-based strategy resulted in changes in the economies which were 
not helpful from the point of view of longer-term growth (Lane and Myant 2007; Nölke 
and Vliegenhart 2009).
By the time the financial crisis broke out, there was overall disenchantment in the CEE 
region with the ‘liberal’ convergence strategy and its reliance on FDI (see e.g. Farkas 
2013 or Hunya 2015). The main reason was that this did not result in a sustained high 
level of growth and thus in a perceptible (or even spectacular) narrowing of the income 
gap with developed EU Member States, and high-growth years were not numerous 
enough in all CEE countries for substantial catching up. The problems caused by the 
crisis further deepened this disillusionment, as many of them were related directly 
or indirectly to FDI, for example, the high integration of CEE companies in global or 
European value chains in hard-hit industries, or increased repatriation of profits by 
crisis-ridden multinational companies. Moreover, FDI inflows substantially declined 
during the crisis and post-crisis years, and this now seems to be a lasting phenomenon 
(Hunya 2015; Kalotay 2017).
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3. Reducing the role of foreign-owned companies in the Visegrad 
economies
In this section, we analyse whether there have been efforts to reduce the role of MNC 
subsidiaries in the countries in question, taking a look at which sectors, industries or 
activities are targeted.
Already during the crisis years, over-high foreign exposure, including through FDI, 
emerged as a risk factor in numerous analyses, increasingly questioning the previously 
almost unequivocally positive approach to FDI. Profit repatriation and capital withdrawal 
hit certain CEE countries hard during the crisis years (see e.g. Mencinger 2013), leading 
to political debates about differentiating between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ FDI (see e.g. Zimny 
(2015) for Poland, or Drahokoupil and Galgóczi (2015)). These distinguished between 
‘bad’ market-seeking, horizontal FDI aimed at replacing domestic producers or service 
providers and repatriating profits and thus ‘not beneficial’ for the host economy, and 
‘good’ vertical FDI resulting in many new jobs and exports and allowing domestic 
companies to benefit from becoming part of global or European value chains. 
In the post-crisis years, there have been various signs of the business environment 
turning against FDI in the analysed countries, as seen by an increase in governmental 
instability in the Czech Republic, in Poland and temporarily in Hungary. Moreover, 
governments are increasingly using anti-FDI rhetoric and populist tendencies are 
gaining ground (Havlík and Pinková 2012). Anecdotal evidence points to cases of anti-
FDI measures where certain foreign-owned enterprises are discriminated against, for 
example in public tenders or when regulatory changes force them to ‘voluntarily’ leave 
the country. According to Becker (2016), the current Hungarian and Polish governments 
are striving to expand the role of domestic capital, primarily in the services sector, and 
within the latter, in the banking sector. Tóth (2014) has described the policy change 
as a turn towards selective economic policy nationalism, present everywhere except 
in industry and private-sector business services, where a neoliberal-leaning policy is 
still pursued. Other authors describe the changes in the region as moving in a ‘national 
capitalist’ direction (Szent-Iványi 2017) or in Hungary as ‘corrupt crony capitalism’ 
(Benczes 2016; Kornai 2015).
Nevertheless, aggregate data illustrating changes in the overall restrictiveness of 
government policies towards foreign investors and foreign-owned subsidiaries and in 
the overall deterioration of the business climate for foreign investors are hard to find. 
3.1 Changes in FDI policies
It is not easy to compare the FDI policies of the various governments, in our case 
looking at the level of restrictiveness and changes made. In this section, we use various 
indexes to check for changes in the analysed countries. We then briefly present the case 
of Hungary, which – as already indicated – has made the most efforts to reduce the role 
of foreign subsidiaries in certain areas and activities.
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The OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index facilitates international comparisons 
over time, looking at four main restrictions on FDI: 
— foreign equity limitations;
— screening or approval mechanisms;
— restrictions on the employment of foreigners as key personnel;
— operational restrictions, e.g. restrictions on branching and on capital repatriation 
or on land ownership.2
Though obviously not giving a full picture, the index does provide a good indication of 
the main developments in FDI restrictiveness in a given country.3 Figure 1 shows the 
index for the Visegrad countries and the unweighted OECD average in 2006, 2010 and 
2015. We note that the index values for the analysed countries – with the exception of 
Poland – are well below the OECD average. Czechia stands out with an exceptionally 
non-restrictive FDI policy, while Hungarian restrictiveness has declined over the period 
analysed to approach the Czech level. With the exception of Slovakia, FDI regulatory 
restrictiveness decreased in the Visegrad group between 2006 and 2010, and plateaued 
(with the exception of Czechia) between 2010 and 2015. However, compared with other 
countries examined by the OECD, the Visegrad countries still offer an outstandingly 
liberal FDI climate, with the exception of Poland. There are few areas where restrictions 
remain in force: agriculture and forestry in Czechia and Poland; transportation, 
financial services, other finance and real estate investment in all four countries; and 
the media (radio & TV and other media) and telecommunications (fixed and mobile) in 
Poland. The latter explain the higher index level for Poland. At least according to this 
index, the apparent anti-FDI attitudes do not seem to be present or to have materialised 
in regulatory terms in the analysed countries up till 2015. 
A similar index, part of the Product Market Regulations Index constructed by the 
OECD, tries to measure FDI barriers in an internationally comparable way (Figure 2), 
and arrives at results similar to those of the previous analysis. By 2013, FDI barriers 
were seen to reach a level significantly (Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia) or slightly 
below (Poland) the unweighted OECD average. This indicator shows a clearly declining 
trend between 1998 and 2013, i.e. even here we found no trace of an increased anti-FDI 
stance in Visegrad policies.
Provided by UNCTAD, another source of information looks at the number of 
international investment disputes. Problematic investment cases and disputes between 
states and foreign investors have clearly increased in the four Visegrad countries since 
the crisis (as seen in Figure 3), hinting that the business climate has worsened for 
certain foreign investors. 
2. See http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm
3. The difference between restrictiveness according to ‘more visible’ and ‘less visible’ measures may differ widely: 
‘less-visible’ (i.e. internationally less regulated) measures may result in a different level of restrictiveness, 
see e.g. the comparison of UNCTAD on restrictions on FDI in services in developing countries and transition 
economies. Even in this international comparison, the Visegrad countries exhibit a low level of restrictiveness 
towards FDI in services in 2004, with Czechia being the least restrictive among 50 countries, Hungary ranked 
tenth and Poland sixteenth (UNCTAD 2006).
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Note: higher values of the index indicate more restrictive FDI policies. 
Source: OECD
Note: higher values of the index indicate higher barriers to FDI. 
Source: OECD
Figure 1 FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index of the Visegrad countries, 2006, 2010, 2015
Figure 2 Development of the Barriers to FDI indicator in the four Visegrad countries, 1998, 
2003, 2008, 2013
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The overall FDI environment is thus much less restrictive in the Visegrad countries 
than the OECD average and there have been no negative changes at macro level – at 
least until 2015. However, as already mentioned, anecdotal evidence and the increased 
number of state-foreign investor disputes may point to a worsening policy environment, 
at least for certain FDI projects. 
3.1.1 The Hungarian case
The Hungarian case illustrates the ambiguity of this worsening FDI environment. 
Several legislative changes specifically target foreign-owned subsidiaries in certain 
sectors and industries4, mainly those focused on the domestic market and operating in 
the services sector, and thus considered to be ‘bad’ FDI in government-speak. Changes 
in the laws meant inter alia that foreign-owned companies issuing social vouchers 
were forced out of business in Hungary.5 In 2016, the EC ruled against the Hungarian 
government, as through this legislation it had infringed EC directives on freedom of 
establishment for service providers.6 In the media sector, advertising revenues were 
taxed at 50%, hitting mainly foreign–owned companies.7 In the same sector, the 
government commissioner in charge of the Hungarian film industry acquired one of 
the two large foreign-owned commercial TV channels.8 Through not extending radio 
broadcasting licences to foreign or domestic privately owned channels, only state-run 
4.  See https://www.ft.com/content/e0c44550-0ad2-11e6-b0f1-61f222853ff3 or European Commission (2015) 
underlining the high frequency of legislative changes impacting negatively on certain economic actors.
5.  See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/599 
6.  See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=ecli:ECLI:EU:C:2016:108
7.  See https://www.wsj.com/articles/hungary-adopts-tax-on-advertising-revenue-1402511876 or https://www.
ft.com/content/b86018ca-2c7d-11e5-acfb-cbd2e1c81cca
8. See http://bbj.hu/business/report-andy-vajna-will-own-tv2_105497 
Note: ‘Total’ refers to the number of disputes between 1994 and 2016 (22 years) ; ‘After 2008’ between 2008 and 2016 (8 years). 
Source: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCaseName
Figure 3 Number of investment disputes with the Visegrad countries as respondent states, 
1994-2016
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radio stations (quite strictly controlled by the government) can broadcast nationally.9 
Banks have been taxed at high rates based on their assets and not on profits: changing 
the base from profit to assets and the special tax deductions rules for losses in Ukraine 
and Russia increased the tax burden for foreign-owned banks, while decreasing it 
for their domestically-owned or -controlled counterparts.10 Due to the EC objection 
to their discriminatory nature, the bank tax rules had to be modified in 2016.11 The 
introduction of government regulations on energy prices paid by households, setting 
price levels too low for profitable operations, forced foreign-owned service providers to 
sell their stakes in related companies to the state.12 Changes in regulations caused and 
are planned to cause competitive disadvantages to foreign-owned retail chains vis-à-vis 
their domestically-owned counterparts.13 It is important to note that two EC rulings 
have already underlined the discriminating nature of the new regulations targeting 
mainly foreign-owned subsidiaries. On the other hand, vertical, export-oriented 
manufacturing (in government-speak: ‘productive’ or ‘good’) FDI enjoys generous 
incentives, as witnessed by the automotive industry where foreign investment projects 
enjoy major privileges.14
The ambiguity of Hungarian government policy is underlined by the fact that, by 
lowering corporate tax, there are more and more incentives for multinational companies 
to transfer their profits to Hungary and thus save tax. One outstanding example was 
when the corporate tax paid by General Electric helped improve the Hungarian budget 
situation.15 Certain foreign-owned subsidiaries pay corporate taxes at rates well below 
the 10% threshold characterizing tax constituencies as tax havens. ‘German carmaker 
Audi, for example, did not pay any corporate tax in 2015, as it benefitted from R&D 
tax allowances. Wizz Air, Suzuki, GE, Mercedes and Bosch paid 1-2% corporate tax, 
while South Korean electronics producer Samsung was the only one out of the top 10 
revenue companies in Hungary whose corporate tax payment (15.9%) was close to the 
headline corporate tax rate.’16 At the same time, domestically-owned companies usually 
face a higher effective tax rate than large multinationals. In 2017, corporate tax rate 
was further reduced to 9%17, benefitting mainly large companies18 and incentivizing 
multinational companies to further indulge in tax optimisation.
9. See http://budapestbeacon.com/media-issues/ly-state-run-radio-to-broadcast-nationally-in-hungary-from-
today/42191 
10. See http://www.reuters.com/article/hungary-banks-idUSLDE6AB05520101112 or https://www.ft.com/
content/e0c44550-0ad2-11e6-b0f1-61f222853ff3 , and on rate cuts in 2017: http://www.reuters.com/article/
hungary-tax-banks-idUSB3N14Q026 
11. See https://bbj.hu/economy/hungary-to-change-bank-levy-rules-following-ec-objection_107595 
12. See http://bbj.hu/economy/eon-sells-hungary-natural-gas-firms-to-state-owned-mvm_65251 and Szanyi 
(2016).
13. See http://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/foreign-supermarket-chains-threatened-
by-hungary/ and http://bbj.hu/business/multinational-food-retailers-to-face-strict-regulations-in-
hungary_129928 
14. See https://www.ft.com/content/e0c44550-0ad2-11e6-b0f1-61f222853ff3 
15. See https://bbj.hu/business/ge-hungary-details-impact-of-involvement-in-alstom-acquisition-in-report_117072 
and http://bbj.hu/business/ge-hungary-revenue-huf-4452-tln-last-year-following-alstom-merger_116978 and 
http://www.mkik.hu/en/magyar-kereskedelmi-es-iparkamara/cikkek/hungary-ecomin-secret-revealed-a-
single-company-pays-giant-tax-91826 
16. See http://www.intellinews.com/hungary-aims-to-become-central-europe-s-tax-haven-110896/ 
17. See https://www.ft.com/content/302fa4b4-acda-11e6-9cb3-bb8207902122 
18. European Commission (2017).
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3.2 Changes in FDI inflows
Changes in FDI inflows may indicate that the attractiveness of the countries in question 
has changed, including the ‘welcoming’ stance of government policies, or conversely 
reflect changes in the supply side when less FDI is available to the analysed countries. 
According to Hunya’s chapter in the present book, FDI inflows to the CEE region have 
clearly decreased. He shows that between 2010 and 2015 the FDI/GDP rate hardly 
changed in countries with high FDI penetration, but increased in Poland, a country 
with previously lower exposure to FDI. Furthermore, uniform changes in the Visegrad 
countries (Figure 4) give a hint of the dominance of the supply-side factor in the smaller 
FDI inflows. This is supported by the World Investment Report (UNCTAD 2016), which 
showed that world FDI flows have not regained their pre-crisis levels, or, when they 
have, that this was due to corporate reconfigurations.19
Another important change reported by Hunya in the present book is that domestic 
private and public investments are becoming more important throughout the CEE 
region (with the possible exception of Slovakia), meaning that the share of FDI in 
investment is declining.
However, we call attention to a fact relativizing the role of FDI in the Visegrad countries: 
the FDI stock/GDP ratio is still much higher than the OECD average in Hungary, 
Czechia and Slovakia (Figure 4). 
19. These should be recorded as FDI but they do not comply with the definition of FDI in a strict sense.
Source: OECD
Figure 4 Inward FDI stocks in % of GDP in the analysed countries and in OECD, 2005-2015
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Czechia Hungary OECD - Total Poland Slovak Republic
Is a live dog better than a dead lion?
55Condemned to be left behind?
Furthermore, the share of foreign-owned companies in production value, employment 
and value added increased in the analysed countries during the crisis – as already 
mentioned in the Gábor Hunya chapter (Figure 5). Foreign-owned companies are 
dominant (i.e. with a share above 50%) in certain areas, e.g. in R&D expenditure, in 
Hungarian and Slovakian production value, etc. Thus, even with smaller FDI inflows, the 
better during-crisis performance of foreign-owned subsidiaries compared to domestic 
companies led to these higher shares and thus greater dominance in the analysed 
economies. However, it is important to note that by 2013 the share of foreign-owned 
companies in gross investment in tangible goods declined in all analysed countries, and 
significantly in Slovakia and Czechia. This underlines the decrease in FDI inflows. 
From the point of view of economic growth, it is also apparent from Figure 5 that 
foreign-owned companies are – and have always been - dominant in R&D in all Visegrad 
countries – pointing to the relatively low inclination of domestic firms to invest in R&D 
and innovation. In Hungary for example, domestic companies differ significantly from 
their foreign-owned counterparts in their inclination to innovate, with their focus solely 
on low-technology sectors, but not on high- to medium-technology industries. Thus, the 
different industry composition of subsidiaries and domestic companies may explain the 
differences in their inclination to innovate (Halpern, Muraközy 2012). This explanation 
may also apply to the other Visegrad countries.
Note: ISIC B to N (basically all activities excluding Agriculture and certain Service activities), excluding K (Financial and insurance 
activities). 
Source: OECD AMNE
Figure 5 The share of foreign-owned enterprises in total production value, number of 
employees, value added, gross investment in tangible goods and R&D expenditure 
in the analysed countries, 2008 and 2013 (%)
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Overall, FDI inflows to Visegrad countries declined after the crisis, though seemingly 
as a result of a worldwide decline in FDI flows. On the other hand, the significant – 
and in certain activities outstandingly high – role of foreign-owned companies has not 
changed considerably since the crisis. Overall, the FDI climate is still very liberal in 
OECD comparison. However, anecdotal evidence points at increased pressure being put 
on ‘bad’ FDI – as seen in Hungary.
4. Other potential ‘growth engines’ for the economies
In this section, we look at those groups of companies with the potential to replace – at 
least partly in certain sectors and industries – foreign-owned companies as economic 
growth engines. We will take a closer look at state-owned enterprises, (regional) 
multinationals originating in the analysed countries, large domestic companies and 
domestic SMEs in terms of their share in the economy and of their performance. 
4.1 Changing role of state-owned enterprises 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) allow direct government intervention in the economy 
on economic and non-economic grounds. Such companies were expected to disappear 
after the socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe started embracing capitalism 
through massive privatisation. However, certain SOEs have survived and have been 
playing an increasingly important role in the national economies – and some of them 
even internationally. In certain countries, their role has even increased, alleviating the 
negative effects of the financial crisis (Götz and Jankowska 2016; PWC 2015).
4.1.1 Importance of SOEs in the Visegrad economies
There are different definitions used for determining whether a company can be 
considered as state-owned or not. According to the OECD, SOEs are enterprises where 
the state has significant control through full, majority, or significant minority ownership. 
This can be realised by the central or federal government, as well as by regional and 
local governments.20 
Overall, the number and share of SOEs in the Visegrad economies is relatively low, 
especially considering their recent histories as socialist economies. Based on an analysis 
of the largest companies (Forbes Global 2000), Kowalski et al. (2013) found that the 
share of SOEs in sales, profits, assets and market values as a % of GNI is not exceptional 
20. For analytical purposes, other definitions may be used. For example, in the empirical analysis presented, 
firms where the state holds at least 20% of the shares are considered as SOEs. However, the authors note that 
changing to a 50% threshold would not significantly change the results of their calculations. The OECD uses 
a 50% threshold, distinguishing majority and minority state-owned companies and including both groups of 
companies in the analysis. (Christiansen 2011) Furthermore, Büge et al. (2013) show that a more nuanced 
analysis may take into account both direct and indirect state ownership. They also use the 50% threshold of 
(combined direct and indirect) ownership share.
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in Poland and Czechia in OECD comparison and is lower than in the BRIICS21 countries.22 
In the OECD, in terms of the ‘economic weight’ of SOEs, the Visegrad countries are 
similar to Scandinavian countries – with a declining trend since 2005 (Christiansen 
2011). In the European Union23, Hungary was ranked sixth, Czechia seventh, Slovakia 
eighth and Poland 13th based on the share of government participation in the capital 
of corporations as a % of GDP in 2014. Their shares were not substantially higher than 
those of the Netherlands, Austria or Ireland from the EU-15. (European Commission 
(2016) Graph I.2.1, p. 12).
Pre-2010 privatisation, carried out using different methods, led to a decline in the 
number of non-listed SOEs in Czechia, Poland and Hungary.24 At that time, SOEs were 
basically those enterprises which had not been privatised. Furthermore, the state had 
a minority stake in a number of companies (Christiansen 2013). The number of SOEs 
dropped further in Poland after 2010, but increased in Hungary, with the result that 
Hungary, by 2012, had the highest number of SOEs compared to the other two countries 
(Figure 6) – but their economic significance was still not high in OECD comparison, as 
many of these companies were quite small and economically insignificant (Christiansen 
21. Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa.
22. Tables 3 and 4 on pp. 21 and 22 in Kowalski et al. (2013).
23. Without data for Belgium, Cyprus, Croatia, France, Greece and Luxemburg.
24. Slovakia did not provide data.
Note: listed companies: their shares are traded on a stock exchange; non-listed: shares are not traded on a stock exchange; the OECD 
presents data for listed and non-listed companies separately. 
Source: own calculations based on the OECD database, available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/oecd-dataset-size-composition-
soe-sectors.htm
Figure 6 Number of majority-owned, listed and non-listed SOEs in Czechia, Hungary and 
Poland, 2009 and 2012
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2013). Looking at their market value, they are tiny compared to for example the GDP 
of the analysed countries. In the case of Hungary, the one majority-owned, listed 
enterprise accounts for no more than 0.04% of 2012 GDP. In the case of Czechia and 
Poland, understandably, these shares are even lower: 0.014% and 0.005%, respectively.
Declining between 2009 and 2012, the economic ‘weight’ of the SOEs is negligible with 
regard to the number of employees, especially in Czechia and Hungary (Figure 7).
As for more recent developments, Deloitte (2016) points to a continuing decrease in the 
number of SOEs among the top 500 firms in 18 countries in Central Europe25. In 2015, 
their number was nine in Czechia, nine in Hungary, 34 in Poland and five in Slovakia 
– altogether 57 enterprises, representing more than two-thirds of the total 85 SOEs in 
the 18 analysed Central, Eastern and South-East European countries. In Hungary after 
2010, their increase was the most pronounced in certain sectors (banking and public 
utilities), with explicit political aims targeting the ‘re-nationalisation’ of these industries 
(Mihályi 2015).
The role of SOEs is suspected to be similar to or even higher in Slovakia than in the 
other three countries. As we see, Slovakia is not usually covered by the OECD analysis 
25. The 18 analysed countries are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, 
Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Ukraine.
Source: own calculations based on OECD database, available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/oecd-dataset-size-composition-soe-
sectors.htm
Figure 7 Number of employees of listed and non-listed SOEs in Czechia, Hungary and Poland, 
2009 and 2012
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of SOEs. The non-transparent nature of SOEs in this country is however underlined in 
various publications.26 According to Transparency International, five of the ten biggest 
employers in Slovakia are SOEs, while the 80 most important SOEs manage assets 
totalling EUR 9.5 billion, equal to about half of state budget expenditure. 
Overall, with the possible exception of Slovakia, the number and especially the economic 
significance of SOEs tends to be low in the Visegrad countries, meaning that they cannot 
be considered as alternative growth engines.
4.1.2 Hybrid Visegrad SOEs
The various databases use the traditional definition of SOEs as presented above. 
However, an important feature of today’s SOEs is that the state has a much smaller 
share of ownership and private entities a much larger share than was previously the case. 
Furthermore, a new type of SOE has emerged, where state ownership does not necessarily 
result in state control, and where the latter may be exercised without significant state 
ownership (Diefenbach and Sillence 2011; Bruton et al. 2015). These changes are also 
to be seen in the Visegrad countries (see e.g. for Poland Baltowski and Kozarzewski 
2016, for Hungary Szanyi 2016 or, for one Hungarian state-owned company, Antalóczy 
and Sass 2016). Why is this distinction important? SOEs were previously established 
for certain social or economic purposes (employment creation in general or for certain 
groups of people, carrying out R&D of strategic importance, providing public services 
etc.). Nowadays, with the higher share of private ownership, certain SOEs operate as if 
they were completely private, with a focus on profit maximisation. Overall, SOEs often 
combine commercial and non-commercial objectives (European Commission 2016).
These recent changes justify why SOEs are defined on the basis of state control rather 
than state ownership. According to the European Commission (2016), direct state 
control over business enterprises has decreased significantly in Czechia and Hungary 
among the analysed countries. We can thus assume that at least part of Visegrad SOEs 
are operating on lines more similar to private enterprises. On the other hand, we have 
anecdotal evidence that Visegrad governments have strengthened their influence on the 
governance structure in mixed ownership companies (Szanyi 2016). Hybrid SOEs – in 
circumstances of changing regulations and policy stances – consequently provide, in 
countries with less strong protection of minority ownership rights, an opportunity to 
increase government influence in the SOE sector and the role of the state as proprietor.
4.1.3 Concentration in sectors – industries
SOEs are generally active in certain sectors providing public services, including health 
and social insurance, and in ‘natural monopolies’ such as railways and electricity 
26. See e.g. the report of the Transparency International Slovakia http://www.transparency.sk/en/slovenske-
statne-firmy-su-netransparentne-a-spolitizovane/ or Nechala et al. (2015), which concentrated on the 
operational transparency of publicly-owned companies in Slovakia. In the various fields related to transparency, 
the score was lowest for Slovak SOEs compared to Czech, Slovak private and foreign companies. 81 state-, city- 
or county-owned companies were analysed. State-owned ones dominate (a total of 43), followed by city-owned 
(34) and county-owned (4).
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transmission, and Visegrad countries are no exceptions to this rule. In 2015, the 
overwhelming majority of the 85 large Visegrad SOEs were active in the energy and 
resources sector (59 companies) and consumer business and transportation (15 
companies) (Deloitte 2016).
Other information sources further highlight the dominance of these sectors. Looking at 
data on listed entities, we find for example that CEZ, a Czech company in which the state 
has a 63+% stake, operates in the generation, trading and distribution of power and 
heat, as well as coal mining.27 According to the Czech Ministry of Finance28, Eximbank 
and the Export Guarantee Agency, CEZ, the Congress Centre Prague, CEPRO (fuel 
trade), Czech Airlines and MERO (crude oil pipelines) are by far the largest Czech SOEs 
based on their base capital. All these companies are focused on the domestic market, 
with negligible exports.
In Hungary, two important listed minority SOEs are significant exporters and 
foreign investors: MOL (oil and gas) and Richter Gedeon (pharmaceutical industry). 
The other companies mainly serve the domestic market. Despite the high level of 
internationalisation of the industry in which it operates, Rába Holding, a company with 
74.34% state ownership and producing (parts for) commercial vehicles, agricultural 
machinery and earthmovers as well as automotive components and specialty vehicles, 
only operates on the domestic market.29 There are 370 majority-owned, non-listed 
SOEs with negligible market values, except those in finance (mainly EXIMBank-
MEHIB), electricity and gas (mainly the Paks nuclear plant and other power stations) 
and transportation (Hungarian Railways, bus companies) (OECD 2014), again mainly 
serving the domestic market. 
In the case of Poland, according to the OECD database (2014), among the six majority 
state-owned listed entities in 2012, three operated in the primary sector, one in 
manufacturing and two in electricity and gas. Among the ten minority-owned and 
listed firms, two were active in mining, three in manufacturing, three in finance, one 
in electricity and gas and one in other utilities. Companies in the primary sector and in 
finance have the highest market value. 
In Slovakia, it is mainly public services which are operated by the state. We have 
detailed information on the energy sector, where combined state and private ownership 
is common. The state owns 100% of the shares of the national gas supplier Slovak Gas 
Industry, 51% in all electricity distribution companies, and 49 % in the gas transmission 
system operator.30 As stated by Nechala et al. (2015), the ‘usual’ public services 
(transport, forests, water and electricity management, power plants, post, the exim- and 
27. https://www.cez.cz/en/cez-group/cez-group.html
28. http://www.mfcr.cz/en/themes/state-property-management/2016/the-shareholdings-of-the-czech-
republic-26340
29. http://www.raba.hu/english/our_profile.html, according to its balance sheet, the company had no exports in 
2015, while 0.3% of sales were realised abroad in 2014.
30. Furthermore, in December 2015 the Italian (actually state-owned) utility company Enel signed an agreement 
with the Ministry of Economy granting the state an option to increase its stake in Slovenske Elektrarne, which 
controls 73% of the domestic electricity generation market, by an additional 17% (thus reaching a 51% majority), 
see https://www.export.gov/article?id=Slovakia-Competition-from-State-Owned-Enterprises
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development bank, radio and television, the national lottery, airports etc.) can be found 
among state-owned companies.31 
Overall, SOEs in the Visegrad countries are active in certain public services and utilities, 
with a few exceptions, especially in Poland and Hungary.
4.1.4 Performance of SOEs
Looking at country-level data for the Visegrad economies (European Commission 
2016), SOEs perform considerably worse than their private counterparts, limiting 
– together with their sector and industry distribution and export intensity - their 
potential role as growth engines. This is to be expected given the raison-d’être of SOEs, 
as some of them have motives other than profit. In the period between 2004 and 2013, 
the return on equity in private firms was in most cases substantially higher than in 
SOEs, though the difference narrowed during the crisis years, due to a severe decline 
in private company profits. Furthermore, the average return on equity for SOEs turned 
negative during the crisis years in Hungary and Poland. For the same period, another 
sectoral analysis32 (European Commission 2016) showed that the return on equity 
for SOEs was significantly lower in all industries, except for transport and storage. 
Underlining political influence, one interesting finding is that the profitability of state-
owned enterprises in energy and public utilities is significantly lower in election years. 
Using TFP33, SOEs perform worse than private companies in certain industries where 
their presence is not common: in consumer staples, chemicals and metal processing, 
i.e. mainly in manufacturing industries. However, in other industries the difference is 
either small or basically disappeared during the crisis. At country level, Visegrad SOEs 
underperform private ones in consumer staples in Hungary, and in public utilities in 
Czechia. This is backed by the result of an analysis of Hungary, where in 2015, the 
majority of SOEs were still loss-making.34 In Czechia, CEZ Group is the most profitable 
and the least indebted power company.35 Looking at labour productivity, the situation 
was similar to TFP. This analysis also showed that improved governance has a positive 
effect on both SOE productivity and profitability. SOEs negatively impact allocative 
efficiency in the industries where they are present, especially in Hungary and Slovakia. 
According to one analysis, similar to those of the other three Visegrad countries, 
Slovakian SOEs perform weakly.36  
As for their impact on exporting, the industry breakdown of SOEs and their limited 
presence among manufacturing companies in the Visegrad countries indicate that their 
share in total exports is quite low, except for certain industries, especially in Hungary.
31. http://www.transparency.sk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/statne_firmy_web_a5_eng.pdf
32. This analysis was carried out on eight countries, the Visegrad countries + Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and 
Slovenia. 
33. TFP: total factor productivity, measures the efficiency of the contribution of the inputs (labour and capital) to 
production.
34. https://www.opten.hu/kozlemenyek/javuloban-az-allami-cegek-eredmenyessege-de-donto-tobbseguk-meg-
mindig-veszteseges
35. https://www.cez.cz/en/cez-group/cez-group.html
36. https://www.export.gov/article?id=Slovakia-Competition-from-State-Owned-Enterprises
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4.1.5 The regulatory role of SOEs
As stated by Christiansen (2013) in an interesting analysis, the main purpose of state 
ownership in Hungary is as an alternative to overregulation, and in certain sectors 
this assures sufficient investment. This contrasts substantially with the other, more 
developed countries analysed in the cited paper (Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand 
and Norway), but may be similar in other Visegrad countries. It is also stated that 
Hungarian SOEs are directly monitored by the state (in contrast to other developed 
OECD countries), with specific targets set for them and possibly with instructions to 
depart from normal earnings targets (i.e. fulfilling non-commercial aims). This points 
to the hybrid nature of Hungarian SOEs, allowing them to be classified as for-profit 
or non-profit organisations. For–profit organisations are expected to perform well 
compared to comparable private firms, while non-profit companies can supplement 
their market earnings with various sources, including subsidies and levies. ‘Hungary 
is very transparent about non-commercial objectives in designated public interest 
companies, but much less so in the case of for-profit SOEs with certain non-profit 
assignments’ (Christiansen 2013: 15). We can suspect this increased state involvement 
to be found in the other three Visegrad countries as well, leading us to the next ‘role’ 
played by government: as a regulator.
The role of the state as a regulator, shaping the business environment of the individual 
Visegrad economies, may also be important – as it indirectly impacts FDI and foreign-
owned companies operating in the countries in question37. The higher state activity in 
this area can partly be attributed to the heritage of the socialist era. Measuring and 
comparing the extent of the regulatory role of the state are problematic, given the lack of 
aggregated data. However, the OECD Indicators of Product Market Regulation provide 
a comprehensive and internationally comparable set of indicators,38 measuring the 
degree to which government policies hinder or promote competition in various product 
markets. They are currently available for 4 years: 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013 and for 
all four analysed countries. We look specifically at the indicator on state control (Figure 
8), an index based on two sets of data: data on public ownership (sub-indicators: scope 
of SOEs, government involvement in network sectors, direct control over enterprises, 
governance of SOEs) and involvement in business operations (price controls, command 
and control regulations). It thus partly reflects the role of SOEs in the economies in 
question, and partly the role of the state. 
In terms of trends between 1998/2003 and 2013, all four countries significantly 
diminished state control in product markets, though this trend seems to have been 
broken (maybe reversed?) in 2013 in the case of Hungary. However, it is important to 
note that in 2013, Czechia and Hungary were below, Slovakia around the unweighted 
OECD average, while Poland’s indicator was substantially higher. 
Thus, in an OECD comparison, the ‘level’ of state control can be assessed as low or 
average (with the exception of Poland) in the Visegrad countries.
37. As could be seen in the section on anti-FDI regulatory government measures in Hungary.
38. See http://www.oecd.org/economy/growth/indicatorsofproductmarketregulationhomepage.htm
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4.2 Visegrad multinationals
Multinational companies are by definition especially competitive, as they can 
internationalise successfully and perform well in international competition. 
4.2.1 Limited outward FDI
According to data on outward foreign direct investment (OFDI), the Visegrad countries 
can be considered as the most active outward investor countries among the New EU 
Member States. However, compared to developed countries, their OFDI stock is quite 
small (Table 1). With the exception of Slovakia, around one quarter of the total outward 
FDI stock went to other New Member States, pointing to the existence of regional 
multinationals, while also indicating the importance of non-CEE markets for Visegrad 
investors. For Slovakia, that share is much higher, mainly due to the high value of OFDI 
stock in Czechia, partly ‘inherited’ from the pre-secession period, partly explained by 
remaining strong economic and cultural ties between the two countries. (Ferencik 2012 
or Sass 2017). 
However, not all FDI stock can be considered as foreign investments by domestic 
companies. The data of the national banks on outward foreign direct investments 
contain values of transactions realised by resident entities, regardless of their ultimate 
controlling owners. Thus, both direct and indirect (i.e. realised by local subsidiaries 
of foreign multinational companies) OFDI is included in these data. For example, in 
Sass (2015) I showed that, of the outward FDI in the electronics sector, the share of 
domestically-owned companies was around one-third in Hungary and Poland. The 
majority of OFDI in this industry is realised by local subsidiaries of foreign multinational 
Note: index scale 0 to 6 from least to most restrictive. 
Source: OECD
Figure 8 Product market regulation: indicator of state control
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companies, such as the Korean company Samsung, the Taiwanese Foxconn or the US 
General Electric in the case of Hungary. According to Rugraff (2010), in the case of 
Poland, it may be more domestically-owned and -controlled companies which invest 
abroad, whereas, in the case of Czechia and Hungary, the share of indirect OFDI, i.e. 
OFDI realised by local subsidiaries of foreign multinationals, is higher than that of 
domestically-controlled firms. 
To identify ‘real’ Visegrad multinationals, we have to go down to company level. For 
Hungary and Poland, this is easier, because the EMGP39 reports, respectively Sass 
and Kovács (2015) for Hungary and Kaliszuk and Wancio (2013) for Poland, of the 
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment prepared on the domestic multinationals 
of these countries list the largest domestic(ally controlled) multinational non-financial 
companies, based on the size of their foreign assets.
4.2.2 Few domestic multinationals
Overall, relatively large-sized companies with foreign subsidiaries are quite rare in the 
Visegrad countries. In Czechia, CEZ constitutes a state-owned regional multinational, 
with subsidiaries in Bulgaria (4 acquisitions in 2005 and 2006), Romania (since 
2005), Poland (since 2006), Hungary (close to 8% ownership share in MOL, the petrol 
company), Slovakia, Turkey and Albania.40 Other important foreign investors include 
Zentiva in the pharmaceutical industry and Skoda in the automotive industry, both of 
which were originally Czech companies, but are now respectively owned by the French 
Sanofi and the German Volkswagen, i.e. they are no longer Czech-controlled companies 
(Zemplinerova 2012).
39. Emerging Markets Global Players project at the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, see http://ccsi.
columbia.edu/publications/emgp/ , analysing multinational enterprises from emerging markets.
40. https://www.cez.cz/en/cez-group/cez-group.html
Table 1 Outward foreign direct investments of the Visegrad countries in international 
comparison, 2012
Note: NMS11: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
Source: calculations based on Eurostat data (for Hungary, data of the Hungarian National Bank were used due to missing Eurostat 
data)
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4
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Turning to Hungary, the OTP bank, the petrol company MOL, the pharma company 
Richter Gedeon and electrical manufacturer Videoton are multinational companies 
with substantial foreign assets (more than 100 million USD) (Sass et al. 2012; Sass and 
Kovács 2015). Lowering the threshold to 20 million USD, they are joined by eight other 
companies (Waberer’s and MPF in transportation, Mediso, a manufacturer of medical 
instruments, Masterplast, producing building materials, Jász-Plasztik in plastics 
production, Arcadom in construction and Vajda-Papír in paper production). They 
are however much smaller in both total size and foreign assets than their developed-
country counterparts. Expressed in terms of GDP, the foreign assets of the top 20 
foreign-investing Hungarian firms represent less than 0.02%.
In Poland, multinational companies are on average larger. There are 12 companies with 
more than 100 million USD foreign assets (Kaliszuk and Wancio 2013). The two largest 
and the fifth are active in oil and gas exploration and distribution. The third, Asseco, 
provides software and IT services. The rest are two chemical and one pharmaceutical 
companies, two machinery manufacturers, two building materials producers and one 
wholesale trade and IT services company. Eight more companies have foreign assets 
exceeding 20 million USD, among them mining, metallurgy, building materials, 
pharma, software-IT and machinery companies. In terms of GDP, the foreign assets of 
the top 30 foreign-investing firms represent less than 0.002%.
Small multinationals, among them born globals or international new ventures, exist 
in all Visegrad countries. They differ from the above-described firms in terms of their 
target countries, often developed countries. However, their size is much smaller than 
the above-mentioned top Visegrad multinationals (See e.g. Nowinski and Rialp 2013; 
Kiss et al. 2012; Lamotte and Colovic 2015; Danik et al. 2016). 
Why do Visegrad companies go abroad? Most often in search of new markets (see e.g. 
Svetlicic et al. (2007) for SMEs or the overview of the literature in Trąpczyński (2016)). 
As a basis for internationalisation, Visegrad companies can rely on their specialist 
knowledge on restructuring enterprises previously operating in a planned or an evolving 
market economy environment, or on brands known from the pre-transition era. Some 
of them rely on efficiency-seeking investments in geographically close countries with 
significantly lower wages, transferring labour-intensive activities there. The existence of 
the efficiency-seeking motive points to the probability of a stronger impact on exports in 
the analysed countries. The existence of this type of domestic multinationals is featured 
in a few articles for all four countries (see e.g. Zemplinerova (2012) for Czechia; Sass et 
al. (2012) for Hungary; Gorynia et al. (2014); Gorynia et al. (2015) or Trąpczyński (2015) 
for Poland; Ferencik (2012) for Slovakia or Sass (2016) for the electronics industry in 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia). However, they are in a clear minority compared to 
market-seeking firms.
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4.2.3 The impact of Visegrad multinationals on their home economies 
While relatively understudied, especially in economics literature, certain political 
economy approaches underline the national character of multinational companies and 
their positive impact on the development of their home country (see e.g. Doremus et al. 
(1998) or Gilpin (2001)). 
First of all, of course, OFDI must be relatively high in order for it to have any sizeable 
impact on the home economy, which is not really the case in any Visegrad country. 
Furthermore, the impact on the home economy is rarely analysed, especially in the case 
of emerging economies and even less in the case of the former transition economies. 
Empirical evidence is also lacking (Gorynia et al. 2015). 
Multinational companies can have various positive and negative impacts on their 
respective home economies. An important beneficial impact can be the increase in the 
productivity of the investing company through reverse spillovers (Gorynia et al. 2015), 
the extent of which depends on the absorptive capacity of the company in question. 
There is no conclusive empirical evidence on the existence of these benefits and no 
analysis exists for the Visegrad countries. 
Furthermore, profit repatriation may positively affect the balance of payments of the 
sending countries. A closer look at the host country composition of OFDI from the 
four Visegrad countries (Table 2) however reveals that the foreign-investing Visegrad 
companies quite often target tax havens. This indicates that OFDI can lead to the 
erosion of the domestic capital and tax base: Visegrad companies and subsidiaries 
of foreign multinationals investing in third countries are increasingly relying on the 
tax optimisation opportunities offered by various countries, such as the Netherlands, 
Cyprus, the Dutch Antilles or Luxemburg (in the Czech statistics, a separate row deals 
with OFDI to offshore financial centres). However, this is in line with worldwide trends, 
as pointed out by the 2016 World Investment Report (UNCTAD 2016). Nevertheless, 
Visegrad OFDI is so tiny compared to that of developed countries or the BRICS that 
it is hardly visible in global comparison.41 Though such tax ‘optimisation’ efforts by 
multinationals are no new phenomenon, they increased during the crisis years, as 
pointed out by Hunya (2015) or Antalóczy and Sass (2015). The tax erosion problem is 
similarly indicated by UNCTAD (UNCTAD 2016), calling attention to the fact that ratios 
of income attributed to foreign subsidiaries of outward-investing countries to the gross 
domestic product (GDP) of the economy where these subsidiaries are domiciled reveal 
profits out-of-line with economic fundamentals.
Thus overall, OFDI is possibly leading to the erosion of the tax base in Visegrad 
countries, with the possible exception of Hungary which itself acts as a quasi tax haven 
due to its exceptionally low corporate tax rate.
41. In Hungary, besides this type of ‘tax optimisation’ OFDI, Special Purpose Entities play a significant role in both 
inward and outward direct investments, but the Hungarian National Bank calculates FDI data both with and 
without such entities (Antalóczy, Sass 2015).
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One positive effect identified in the case of emerging multinational companies is that, 
through outward investment, they can acquire hitherto lacking ownership advantages, 
thus making them more competitive internationally (see e.g. Child and Rodrigues 2005 
in the case of Chinese multinationals). Given the characteristics of the companies, such 
foreign investments may be present in the Visegrad countries as well, though this aspect 
has not (yet) been examined.
Another impact of OFDI on the home country is the possible reduction of capital available 
for investment in the home country and the transfer of jobs abroad. However, on the 
one hand the relatively limited size of OFDI, on the other hand the dominance of the 
market-seeking motivation over the efficiency-seeking one leads us to the assumption 
that job losses may be very limited.
The potential magnitude of the impact on domestic economic development can be 
assessed on the basis of the sporadic data available on foreign subsidiaries of Visegrad 
MNCs (Figure 9). Their shares are only non-negligible in the case of Hungary’s 
production value and Poland’s production value and investment.
Table 2 Top 10 host countries of Visegrad OFDI and their shares in total OFDI in %
Notes: Czechia: 2014; Hungary: 2015; Poland: 2015; Slovakia: 2014. 
Source: national banks of the analysed countries, data on foreign direct investments for Slovakia: OECD FDI database (http://stats.
oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=64238#)
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Thus, while the existence of Visegrad multinationals is a fact, they remain quite small 
compared to their respective economies, with the possible exception of Hungary and 
maybe Poland, while their characteristics are such that they have yet to have a sizeable 
overall growth impact on their home economies. Nevertheless, given their concentration 
in certain industries, they may positively impact these industries in the individual 
Visegrad countries.
4.3 Are there signs of an increasing role of domestically-owned companies? 
These companies may be ‘natural’ candidates for taking over the driving seat from the 
foreign-owned subsidiaries of multinational companies – especially if the latter are 
now less welcome in certain sectors, industries or activities. In this section, two sub-
groups of ‘natural’ candidates are looked at: domestically-owned or -controlled large 
companies and small and medium-sized companies (SMEs). 
4.3.1 Large domestically-owned (or -controlled) companies
There is considerable overlap between large companies on the one hand and state-
owned companies and Visegrad multinationals on the other hand, as demonstrated by 
the Deloitte study (2016) on large (based on their revenues) companies. The following 
table (Table 3) contains the Deloitte data for the four Visegrad countries. Out of the 
Source: own calculations based on data from OECD AMNE
Figure 9 Visegrad-owned foreign subsidiaries’ production value, number of employees, value 
added and gross investment in tangible goods compared to domestic totals, 2010 
and 2013 (%)
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500 largest companies of the CEE and SEE region42, 355 (71%) come from the Visegrad 
countries (74 from Czechia (14.8%), 67 from Hungary (13.4%), 182 from Poland 
(36.4%) and 32 from Slovakia (6.4%)), underlining the dominant economic role of these 
countries in the region. 
Furthermore, among large companies, local subsidiaries of foreign-owned 
multinationals dominate in all four countries, with their share among large-sized 
companies outstandingly high in Hungary and Slovakia (almost 80%), relatively high in 
Czechia (more than 60%) and slightly more than half in Poland. 
Among domestically-owned companies, SOEs are very important. The share of 
domestically-owned companies is the highest in Poland (87 firms (48%), of which 34 
are SOEs (19% of total)), followed by Czechia (25 firms, 34%, including 9 SOEs (12% 
of total)). By contrast, domestically-owned companies are almost exclusively SOEs in 
Hungary (11 firms, 16 %, of which 9 are SOEs (13% of total)) and exclusively SOEs in 
Slovakia (5 firms, 16%). Different privatisation schemes and speeds clearly have an 
impact in this respect.
In the cases of Hungary and Poland, a few foreign majority-owned companies can be 
considered as domestically-controlled and thus as indigenous companies. The reason is 
that their shares are traded on the local stock exchanges and, though in majority foreign 
ownership, their ownership structure is dispersed, i.e. no single foreign owner owns 
more than 10 per cent of the shares. A few of them feature among the top companies 
as well, such as MOL, Richter Gedeon or OTP Bank in the case of Hungary (Sass et al. 
2012). However, even with these, the number of domestically-controlled, but not state-
owned firms is very low in Hungary and Slovakia, moderate in Czechia and relatively 
high solely in Poland. 
42. The analysis covers the Visegrad countries, the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
Table 3 Breakdown of the top companies by ownership (number of companies)
Source: based on Deloitte (2016)
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In the financial services sector, Visegrad countries similarly dominate the list of the 
top 50 banks in the region with a total of 33 banks (two-thirds of the total). Poland 
has 15, the Czech Republic 8, Hungary 6 and Slovakia 4. Here again, foreign-owned 
banks dominate. Only two domestically-owned banks stand out. While the second-
placed bank, the Hungarian OTP, can be classified as the only regional multinational 
(Raiffeisen Research 2016), the top bank, PKO Bank Polski, is 30% state-owned and 
has the highest market share in the CEE region with 8.2% (mainly due to domestic 
operations) (OTP Bank 2.9%) (Raiffeisen Research 2016: 63).
Similarly, in the manufacturing sector, the Visegrad dominance is clear among the top 
10 firms in the CEE region: we find only two non-Visegrad-based ones. Of the Visegrad 
companies, three are Czech, three Hungarian and two Slovakian, with subsidiaries of 
foreign automotive multinationals dominant (Skoda Auto and Hyundai in Czechia, Audi 
and Mercedes-Benz in Hungary and Volkswagen and Kia in Slovakia). The privately-
owned Agrofert from Czechia (food, chemicals and other industries) and the Hungarian 
subsidiary of the US General Electric also feature in the list of top manufacturing firms. 
Overall, 2015 data show the overwhelming dominance of foreign subsidiaries among 
large companies. Domestic, privately-owned companies are only present in Czechia and 
especially in Poland in significant numbers.
4.3.2 Domestic(ally-owned) small and medium-sized enterprises
The experience of certain countries and regions shows that the activities of dynamically 
growing, competitive SMEs can be a basis for dynamic economic growth. In terms of 
the distribution of the number of companies, the Visegrad countries have a large SME 
sector, even in an EU comparison (Figure 10).
However, the company population of all four Visegrad countries is skewed towards the 
dominance of micro-companies with less than ten employees. Compared with the EU, 
it is apparent that in all four countries the share of micro-companies accounts for more 
than 94 % of the total number of companies. It is also apparent that the number of 
companies with 10 to 19 and 20 to 49 employees is less than in the EU28 as a whole. 
With the exception of Poland, the share of the medium-sized (50 to 249 employees) and 
large companies (> 250 employees) is also slightly smaller than in the EU28 (Figure 10).
Concerning the sector-industry composition of SMEs in the Visegrad countries, it 
differs greatly from that of the EU-28 overall (Figure 11). The share of manufacturing 
and construction SMEs is relatively high (substantially higher than the EU-28 average) 
in all Visegrad countries except Hungary. Everywhere, the number of wholesale and 
retail trade companies is the highest, though in Czechia and Hungary it is below the EU 
average. The number of companies in information and communication, in professional, 
scientific and technical activities and especially in administrative and support service 
activities and their share in total is by far the highest in Hungary. Especially in the 
two latter categories, this high share can be attributed to micro-companies (below 
10 employees) in Hungary. Another analysis drew similar conclusions, seeing Czech 
SMEs as skewed towards manufacturing, Hungarian ones as being mainly involved 
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in wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, professional activities and construction, 
Polish ones concentrated in lower value-added sectors, and Slovakian ones in 
manufacturing (Daszkiewicz 2014).
The sector-industry composition determines to a great extent the exporting potential of 
SMEs, meaning that there are wide differences within the country group in the extent 
to which SMEs contribute to exports. For example, the share of manufacturing SMEs is 
the highest in Czechia, with Czech SMEs representing more than 50 % of total exports 
in 2011 (Helisek 2013). In Poland, SMEs were responsible for around 44-45% of total 
exports in 2012 (45 % to EU and 43 % to non-EU countries) (Lapinski 2013: 38, Figure 
5), maybe a result of their relatively high shares in manufacturing. On the other hand, the 
SMEs of the other two countries perform differently: in Hungary, their share of exports 
is 26.4% (Mikesy 2013), while in Slovakia – in spite of their relatively frequent presence 
in manufacturing - it is just 18 %.43 Part of SME exports can be attributed to foreign-
owned enterprises. Unfortunately, the breakdown of the SME group into foreign-owned 
and domestically-owned was not available for the analysed countries. One reason for 
the low export contribution could be that micro-enterprises, the dominant company 
size in all Visegrad countries, generally exhibit very low export/sales rates throughout 
the European Union (European Commission 2014).
43. http://spectator.sme.sk/c/20049699/sme-exports-remain-low.html
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat data
Figure 10 The size composition of companies in the Visegrad countries, 2013
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Note: EU-28: 2012 data. 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data
Figure 11 The sector-industry composition of SMEs (0-249 employees), according to the 
number of companies, 2013
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
EU28 Czechia Hungary Poland Slovakia
Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
Transportation and storage
Information and communication
Real estate activities
Professional, scientific and technical activities
Administrative and support service activities
Is a live dog better than a dead lion?
73Condemned to be left behind?
Overall, the internationalisation of Visegrad SMEs is relatively low. One of the few 
comparative studies in this area, Gubik and Bartha (2014) base their findings on 
a survey of Visegrad SMEs resulting in a database on 1124 companies. Important 
findings in our view are that company size and foreign ownership positively influence 
internationalisation. 
Finally, the performance indicators of SMEs point to their potential role in driving 
growth in the economies in question. However, the lack of internationally comparable 
data makes this exercise quite problematic.
The productivity of all company groups, based on their size, is well below the EU28 
average in the Visegrad countries. Productivity correlates with the size of the company 
(Figure 12), as in other countries. However, beside the similarities, there are some 
country differences: Hungarian SMEs seem to be the lowest performers of the four 
Visegrad countries. Czech micro, medium- and large-sized enterprises perform 
relatively well, together with Polish and Slovakian small-sized ones. 
Source: Eurostat, structural business indicators, Annual enterprise statistics by size class for special aggregates of activities 
(NACE Rev. 2)
Figure 12 Gross value added per person employed (thousand euros, 2014)
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5. Conclusions
The problem of convergence is of paramount economic and political importance for the 
Visegrad countries. After 1989, with different starting times, all of them relied to a great 
extent on FDI to catch up with the more developed countries of Europe. In this process, 
the share of foreign-owned subsidiaries in the respective economies grew well above the 
OECD averages, with the exception of Poland. Disenchantment with the performance of 
these MNC subsidiaries in driving growth in the Visegrad economies and accelerating 
their catching-up with the core EU countries within a foreseeable period can be seen 
in all four countries. Furthermore, after the short inward FDI ‘honeymoon’, the crisis 
years showed that certain forms of FDI increased the vulnerability of the economies 
in question. In the ensuing low-FDI post-crisis environment with increased profit 
repatriation, the ‘dark sides’ of being exposed to foreign capital were witnessed in the 
region.
In this environment, Visegrad governments are increasingly looking to other 
potential candidates to drive their economic growth. The rhetoric has changed, with 
a differentiation increasingly being made between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ FDI. However, 
the generous incentives for and the good treatment of subsidiaries already operating 
in these countries, especially in export-oriented manufacturing industries, have not 
changed considerably. 
Otherwise very similar, Visegrad countries differ in terms of changes in their approach 
to FDI and the availability of a ‘non-FDI’ group of companies to help them catch up. We 
have shown that there are not many alternatives to foreign-owned subsidiaries and that 
even these may work differently in the four Visegrad countries. Hungary (and Poland) 
seem to be the most active countries in trying to reduce the share of and reliance on 
foreign-owned companies in certain sectors of the economies. As for alternative 
‘growth engine’ groups of companies, Hungary has a small group of strong regional 
multinational companies, dominating a few industries, while Czechia and especially 
Poland have a relatively high number of domestically-owned large companies. Czech 
micro- and medium-sized and Polish and Slovakian small-sized firms seem to be quite 
competitive.
However, up till now, none of these groups of companies have come to the fore, whether 
as subjects of economic policy or in economic performance. 
Is a live dog better than a dead lion?
75Condemned to be left behind?
References
Antalóczy K. and Sass M. (2015) Through a glass darkly: the content of statistical data on Foreign 
Direct Investment, Studies in International Economics: Special issue of Külgazdaság, 1 (1), 
34-61.
Antalóczy K. and Sass M. (2016) Internationalisation of a minority state-owned pharmaceutical 
company from Hungary: the case of Richter Gedeon, paper presented at the 1st EIBA-workshop 
in the Corvinus University of Budapest, 12 October 2016.
Baltowski M. and Kozarzewski P. (2016) Formal and real ownership structure of the Polish economy: 
state-owned versus state-controlled enterprises, Post-Communist Economies, 28 (3), 405-419.
Becker J. (2016) Europe’s other periphery, New Left Review, 99, May-June 2016. 
https://newleftreview.org/II/99/joachim-becker-europe-s-other-periphery
Benczes I. (2016) From goulash communism to goulash populism, Post-Communist Economies, 
28 (2), 146–166.
Bohle D. and Greskovits B. (2007) Neoliberalism, embedded neoliberalism and neocorporatism: 
towards transnational capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe, West European Politics, 30 (3), 
443-466.
Bruton G. D., Peng M. W., Ahlstrom D., Stan C. and Xu K. (2015) State-owned enterprises around 
the world as hybrid organisations, The Academy of Management Perspectives, 29 (1), 92-114.
Büge M., Egeland M., Kowalski P. and Sztajerowska M. (2013) State-owned enterprises in the global 
economy: reason for concern?, VoxEU, 2 May 2013. http://voxeu.org/article/state-owned-
enterprises-global-economy-reason-concern
Child J. and Rodrigues S. B. (2005) The internationalization of Chinese firms: a case for theoretical 
extension?, Management and Organization Review, 1 (3), 381-410.
Christiansen H. (2011) The size and composition of the SOE sector in OECD countries, OECD 
Corporate Governance Working Papers No. 5, Paris, OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg54cwps0s3-en
Christiansen H. (2013) Balancing commercial and non-commercial priorities of state-owned 
enterprises, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers No. 6, Paris, OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4dkhztkp9r-en 
Cuervo-Cazurra A., Inkpen A., Musacchio A. and Ramaswamy K. (2014) Governments as owners: 
state-owned multinational companies, Journal of International Business Studies, 45 (8), 
919–942.
Danik L., Kowalik I. and Král P. (2016) A comparative analysis of Polish and Czech international 
new ventures, Central European Business Review, 5 (2), 57-73.
Daszkiewicz N. (2014) Small and medium-sized enterprises in Visegrad countries towards 
internationalisation challenges in the European Union, in Duréndez A. and Wach K. (eds.) 
Patterns of business internationalisation in Visegrad countries - In search for regional specifics, 
Cartagena, Universidad Politecnica de Cartagena, 179-191.
Deloitte (2016) Central Europe Top 500. An era of digital transformation. https://www2.
deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/About-Deloitte/central-europe/ce-
top-500-2016.pdf 
Diefenbach T. and Sillince J. A. A. (2011) Formal and informal hierarchy in different types of 
organizations, Organization Studies, 32 (11), 1515–1537.
Doremus P. N., Keller W. W., Pauly L. W. and Reich S. (1998) The myth of the global corporation, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Magdolna Sass
Condemned to be left behind?76
Drahokoupil J. and Galgóczi B. (2015) Introduction. Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern and 
Southern.
European countries: still an engine of growth?, in Galgóczi B., Drahokoupil J. and Bernaciak M. 
(eds.).
Foreign investment in Eastern and Southern Europe after 2008: still a lever of growth?, Brussels, 
ETUI, 19-35.
European Commission (2014) Background study for the European competitiveness report 2014. 
Drivers of SME internationalisation: implications for firm growth and competitiveness. 
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/9054/attachments/1/translations
European Commission (2015) Country report Hungary 2015, SWD(2015) 36 final, 26 February 
2015.
European Commission (2016) State-owned enterprises in the EU: lessons learnt and ways forward in 
a post-crisis context, European Economy Institutional Paper No. 031, Brussels.
European Commission (2017) Country report Hungary 2017 , SWD(2017) 82 final/2, 28 February 
2017, Brussels.
Farkas B. (2013) Changes is in the European convergence model, WIIW Monthly Report No. 1, 
14-19.
Ferencik S. (2012) Outward investment flows and the development path, Eastern European 
Economics, 50 (2), 85-111.
Forbes Global 2000 (2017) The World`s Biggest Public Companies. https://www.forbes.com/
global2000/list/#tab:overall
Galgóczi B. (2009) Boom and Bust in Central and Eastern Europe:
Lessons on the Sustainability of an Externally Financed Growth Model, Journal of Contemporary 
European Research. Volume 5, Issue 4, 614-625. http://www.jcer.net/ojs/index.php/jcer/
article/view/228/187
Gilpin R. (2001) Global political economy: understanding the international economic order, 
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
Gorynia M., Nowak J., Tarka P. and Wolniak R. (2014) Internationalization of Polish forms via 
Foreign Direct Investment: a multiple-case study approach, in Marinov M. and Marinova S. 
(eds.) Successes and challenges of emerging economy multinationals, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 184–216.
Gorynia M., Nowak J., Tarka P. and Wolniak R. (2015) Outward FDI of Polish firms: the role of 
motives, entry modes and location factors, Journal for East European Management Studies, 
20 (3), 328–359.
Gorynia M., Nowak J., Trapczynski P. and Wolniak R. (2015) Government support measures for 
outward FDI: an emerging economy’s perspective, Argumenta Oeconomica, 1 (34), 229-258.
Götz M. and Jankowska B. (2016) Internationalisation by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) after the 2008 crisis. Looking for generalizations, International 
Journal of Management and Economics, 50 (1), 63-80.
Gubik A. S. and Bartha Z. (2014) SME internalisation index (SMINI) based on the sample of the 
Visegrad countries, in Gubik A. S. and Wach K. (eds.) International entrepreneurship and 
corporate growth in Visegrad countries, Mickolc, University of Miskolc, 23-40.
Halpern L. and Muraközy B. (2012) Innovation, productivity and exports: the case of Hungary, 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 21 (2), 151-173.
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